

---

## ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (DHP-P247)

**Fridays 10:30-12:30; Crowe 307**

**Instructor:**

Professor Antonia H. Chayes  
E-mail: [antonia.chayes@tufts.edu](mailto:antonia.chayes@tufts.edu)  
Office Hours: Wednesday 2-5pm. Cabot 511  
[Classroom](#) tba

**Teaching Assistant:**

Meg Guliford  
[homega.guliford@tufts.edu](mailto:homega.guliford@tufts.edu)

**Staff Assistant:**

Donna Carriker  
[donna.carriker@tufts.edu](mailto:donna.carriker@tufts.edu)

No prerequisites exist for DHP-P247, except to understand the essential documents and the basic organization of western civil and military agencies, although it would be most helpful to have taken, or at least be taking "Role of Force." A take home mid-term will be due on November 13. The course will also require that students either complete a final self-paced exam in the first few days of the exam period or write a paper, which can be an incubator for capstone. The grading break down will be roughly as follows: 25% take home Midterm, 35% class and group participation, and 40% final exam or paper.

Please note: Some of the readings, now "TBD" will be filled in when we determine guest lecturers.

Class participation is very important, and there will be group work. Students are strongly encouraged to come prepared to discuss overarching themes through the lens of their own experiences with civil-military interaction, and to seek out the expertise and perspectives of their classmates both in and out of the classroom. Additionally, students may be asked to specifically prepare for and help lead selected class discussions.

---

### SCOPE OF THE SEMINAR

Changes in warfare over the last decade, and the increasing difficulty of drawing clear legal or political lines within the ballooning grey area of not-war nor-peace, have posed serious challenges to the adequacy of traditional understandings of civil-military relations.

This course seeks to explore these challenges. In particular, it will examine:

- The journey from the ideal of sequential cooperation – civilian policy setting, military execution, civilian rebuilding – to the current requirements for simultaneity, combining kinetic operations with state and society building programs, particularly as has been the case using counter-insurgency doctrine and counter-terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Changes (and confusion) in post-conflict objectives, the definition of "victory", and potential obligations for various actors; Differing perspectives between military and civilian actors at headquarters and in the field on what the goals should be, where there is agreement, and the means for achieving those goals.

- Role confusion: many actors now have a role in grey area warfare—and the lines between civil and military have become blurred.
- The moral, legal, political, and strategic issues posed by the military and/or civilian use of approaches such as targeted killings, assassination and capture away from the battlefield.
- The future threat of cyber warfare, the ways in which such warfare can blur the line between military and civilian policing responsibility, and the civil-military complications inherent in protecting a non-physical battlefield deeply integrated into civilian life across national borders.
- Whether and how civil-military relationships are further complicated by the lack of a clear legal underpinning and a stretched legal framework both domestically and internationally.

## **DHP-P247 KEY QUESTIONS**

The following are some overarching questions we will be addressing throughout DHP-247. While doing your readings and participating in class discussion, begin to develop your views about these questions, even asking whether they address the most important issues. The take home Midterm due on March 15 may draw upon these questions; your reading and group work will enrich your responses. Let us try to address these questions as relevant in class, and we will re-address them during the final class.

- 1. What are some of the major concerns that you can identify about civil-military relations today?**
- 2. How have changes in the nature of warfare and the expanding grey area of not-war-not-peace impacted civil-military relations? To what extent are the relationships governed by the nature of warfare and the identity and objectives of the major players? How might you understand and map the major issues?**
- 3. What have been some of the historic issues with civil-military relationships? How do they differ from the issues of the present? How and why have civil-military relationships evolved/transformed over time?**
- 4. What kinds of configurations of civilian control exist in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Is civilian control of the military still a major issue? If so, in what way?**
- 5. Who are the important actors in modern civil-military relations? Is necessary to consider the relationships between the entire range of actors, i.e. between national military forces and international security forces; between the military and intelligence officials, between military and development/IGO officials; between military forces and local governing bodies; among military forces and the population; between the military and NGOs? Contractors?—or is it better to simplify to a few crucial interactions? What is your rationale?**
- 6. Are there differences of organizational culture between the military and civilian organizations ordinarily involved in a conflict? If so, can these be better articulated to lead to cooperation? Or obstacles because of bureaucratic standard operating procedures (SOPs)?**

7. **Can civil-military relationships be strengthened before conflict? During conflict? How do issues and the players in civil-military negotiation and cooperation differ at different points in a conflict?**
8. **Should we think about civil military relations in the field primarily? What about theatre level? Strategic headquarters? What about civil military relations at the highest levels of government? Internationally: NATO; UN P-5? Are the issues different at different levels? How do they differ with more players?**
9. **To what extent, if at all, does law prescribe these relationships and adapt to cover emerging issues? (International laws that deal with security and governance? Humanitarian laws and laws of war, including customary international law (CIL); UN Charter, Regional charters, Security Council Resolutions? Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)? Rules of Engagement (ROEs)? Domestic constitutions and domestic legislation? etc. Are there areas with little or no governing law? How does that matter?**
10. **Are there significant differences between mature, emerging democracies and autocracies on the issue of civilian control of the military? Are there patterns of change as a state becomes more democratic and stable?**
11. **Does it all boil down to adequate leadership? Or personality mix?**

---

## **RESEARCH RESOURCES**

**For a list of useful additional readings, both general and for each class, please see the background readings on the course's Trunk page. These readings may be especially helpful as resources for a final paper, or if you need additional background on a particular topic.**

---

## **CLASS I - SEPTEMBER 11, 2015**

### ***INTRODUCTION AND BROAD OVERVIEW: SCOPE OF THE PROBLEMS – THEMES FOR THE SEMINAR***

*This class will focus on classic theories of civil-military relations in the United States as well as some of the issues that arise in cases of peace-building, nation-building, and other contemporary problems.*

### **READINGS**

1. Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1957) Chapters 1, 3, and 4 and pp, 189-192.
2. Janowitz, Morris *"The Professional Soldier": A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960) Chapter 1.

3. Cohen, Eliot, "The Unequal Dialogue: Theory and Reality of Civil Military Relations and the Use of Force" in Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, eds. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).
4. Feaver, Peter D. *Armed Servants: Agency Oversight and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) Introduction.

*Suggested Readings:*

5. *Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014.*  
[http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_Quadrennial\\_Defense\\_Review.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf)
6. *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 2015.*  
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241429.pdf>
7. ONLY FOR THOSE UNFAMILIAR WITH U.S. SECURITY STRUCTURE: Whittaker, Alan G., Brown, Shannon A., Smith, Frederick C., & McKune, Elizabeth (2011). *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*. (Research Report, August 15, 2011, Annual Update). Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, 1-18.

---

**CLASS II: SEPTEMBER 18, 2015**

**FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CIVIL-MILITARY THEORY; WHO ARE THE ACTORS (FIRST HOUR); WHY CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IS IMPORTANT**

*This class will review theories of civil-military relations; examine some of the "new" actors and their roles, and question why civilian control of the military is considered key to democracy and essential to admission to NATO and EU.*

**READINGS**

- 1) Review and master the readings for class 1.
- 2) Chayes, Antonia, *Borderless Wars: Civil Military Disorder and Legal Uncertainty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Introduction.
- 3) *Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy*, Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, eds., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 110-127.
- 4) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Study on NATO Enlargement," Chapter 5, September 2, 1995. Available online at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_24733.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm)
- 5) Cottey, Andrew, Edmunds, Tim, and Forster, Anthony, "Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Europe," a Working Paper for the Economic and Social Research Council, 1999. Available via Trunk and online at [ftp://budgie6.ethz.ch/dcaf/ssap/ev\\_civil-military\\_relations.pdf](ftp://budgie6.ethz.ch/dcaf/ssap/ev_civil-military_relations.pdf)

---

**CLASS III: SEPTEMBER 15, 2015**

**HISTORIC CLASS ON CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION—ARE CIV-MIL ISSUES AN OLD STORY? WHAT ARE THE IMPEDIMENTS?**

*In this class we will examine differing “takes” on the Vietnam War, both contemporaneous and recent. Also, we will look at some recurring problems.*

**QUESTIONS**

- A. Why is it so difficult to understand and interpret the history of a long war such as Vietnam? Is there a real risk of selective interpretation of many complex facts and events?
- B. What conclusions do you draw from the assigned reading (and your prior knowledge) about civil-military relations during the Vietnam War? Does Komer seem correct in his characterization of both military and civilian bureaucracy?
- C. Or does Claverly make more sense in his characterization of democracy’s preference of “treasure” over “blood”? Could the case be made more strongly?
- D. Have the important institutions/actors in intervention changed since Vietnam? Do you think the dynamic that Komer describes has been altered by new actors or by important changes in old ones?

**READINGS**

1. Komer, R.W. “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing”; Report to DARPA 1972, (Rand Corporation 1972) Summary through Ch.III (start to p. 36) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R967.pdf>
2. McAllister, James, “Who Lost Vietnam? Soldiers, Civilians and U.S. Military Strategy” *International Security*, Winter 2010/2011, vol. 35, pp. 95-123.
3. Claverly, Jonathan D., “Explaining U.S. Military Strategy in Vietnam: Thinking Clearly About Causation” *International Security*, Winter 2010/2011, vol. 35, pp.124-143
4. Andrade, Dale and Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks, “CORDS/PHOENIX: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future”, *Military Review*, March-April 2006 (skim)

---

**CLASS IV: OCTOBER 2, 2015**

**COUNTER-INSURGENCY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POSSIBLE DEMISE?**

*This class will focus on counterinsurgency theory before looking at “down range” experience. Understanding the theory from one of its architects may shed light on COIN success, failure and what type of future engagements, if any, can be approached through this doctrine.*

**QUESTIONS**

- A. What are the basic requirements of COIN doctrine? Are there drawbacks that could have been anticipated?
- B. Why did it seem to work well in Iraq, especially in Anbar Province and essentially abandoned by its creator, General Petraeus, in Afghanistan?
- C. Does the simultaneity problem (fighting and building) raise new problems that differ from the 1990s?
- D. Are there conditions for success? For example, does success require a host government that has the support of the people? That is competent and honest? What happens if the host government is ineffective or corrupt?
- E. Is COIN likely to be applicable to the conflicts of the future? Is it implementable by a multilateral coalition?

### **READINGS**

1. Sewall, Sarah "A Radical Field Manual" Introduction to the *University of Chicago Press Edition of the US Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago 2007)
2. Isaac, Jeffrey C., et al., "The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis," Vol. 6, No. 2 *Perspectives on Politics* (June 2008).
3. Komer, Robert, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-G.V.N Performance in Vietnam* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972), <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R967.pdf>; Chapters IV, 41-46, 54-55, 60-63; Ch. V, 65-67, 69-70, 74 Ch. VI 75-79 bottom 82-top 87, 90-top 92; Ch VII 110-top 118, 124-top 125; Ch VIII 127-129, 148-149; and Ch. IX 152-161.
4. Chayes, Antonia, *Borderless Wars: Civil Military Disorder and Legal Uncertainty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Chapter III.
5. Stavridis, James, *The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), Chapter 3.
6. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," May 1997. <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>
7. Rodriguez, David, "Strategic Opportunities and Challenges," CSIS Military Strategy Forum, January 27, 2015. <http://csis.org/event/military-strategy-forum-africom-strategic-opportunities-and-challenges>
8. OPTIONAL: (For those unfamiliar with basic insurgency/counterinsurgency theory read chapter 3 "Insurgency Doctrine" and skim whatever else you deem relevant) Galula, David, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Praeger, 1964).
9. OPTIONAL: If you haven't read this elsewhere, you might want to read: Shultz, Richard. *The Marines Take Anbar. The Four Year Fight to Defeat Al Qaeda* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013) Introduction.

---

**CLASS V: OCTOBER 9, 2015**

**IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: "HIGH HOPES AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES"**

**QUESTIONS:**

- A. Should the focus of reconstruction efforts be on the central government? On problem areas? On promising areas? On the people? Or on all of the above?
- B. What kind of planning is needed for the post-conflict situation- where and how should it take place?
- C. To what extent should/must the military participate; even be in charge of reconstruction in cases where there is simultaneity of war and peace?
- D. Are there models of collaboration? In what ways have PRTs been successful in fostering post-conflict reconstruction? Where? Have PRT's eased civil-military role confusion in many cases?

**READING:**

1. Sky, Emma, *The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities* (New York: Public Affairs, 2015) Chapters 18-20.
2. Chayes, Sarah, *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015) Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 11, and Appendix.
3. Abbaszadeh, Nima; Crow, Mark; El-Khoury, Marianne; Gandomi, Jonathan; Kuwayama, David; MacPherson, Christopher; Nutting, Meghan; Parker, Nealin; Perito, Robert; Weiss, Taya. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations." The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, January 2008.
4. OPTIONAL: Woodward, Susan L., "State-building Operations: International v. Local Legitimacy?" presented at Nation-Building, State-Building and International Intervention: Between 'Liberation' and Symptom Relief, Centre d'Etudes et Recherche Internationale and Critique Internationale, Paris (October 15, 2004).

---

**CLASS VI: OCTOBER 16, 2015**

**DEFINING THE DESIRED END STATE OF CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT OBJECTIVES**

*In this class, we will explore classic and new definitions of victory and try to understand how definitions fit the emerging grey areas of "not-war not-peace" operations. We will, in the second hour, ask whether and when victory might bring with it an "obligation to reconstruct", and if so, what is the rationale.*

***We will also divide the class into groups for the exercise on October 31 and briefly discuss it. Please read the exercise requirements so that I can answer questions about preparation over the next two***

***weeks before presentation. Please also get your teams together after class and begin to prepare I will be available in office hours to help you.***

### **QUESTIONS**

- A. Is the desired end state of intervention the same as a definition of victory? Can the end state be defined *a priori*? Do new forms of warfare affect the definition of victory?
- B. What are the possible consequences of *not* defining the desired end state?
- C. What relationship might the concept of “winning” have with the responsibilities assumed for post-conflict reconstruction? How, if at all, does the desired end state help to determine the strategy of post-conflict tasks to be pursued?
- D. Is there an obligation to reconstruct? If so, it is based on legal principles? Moral principles? Altruism? National interests? Does it operate regardless of participation in kinetic activities? Discuss legal and policy issues.
- E. Who is/should be responsible for defining the end-state? The intervener(s)? The local population? The international community through the UN?
- F. Is there “Jus Post-Bellum”? Is it understood and accepted by all the “players”? Do all participants share the same goal? At what level of abstraction? Who, if anyone sets and articulates these goals?
- G. When is the goal *stability*; when is it full-blown *democracy*? What has been the attitude toward “nation-building? What is it now?

### **READINGS**

1. Martel, William. *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy* (New York; Cambridge University Press 2011) Ch 2 & 5
2. Chayes, Antonia. “Chapter VII ½: Is Jus Post Bellum Possible?” *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 24 no. 1. (2013). Available online at <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/24/1/2382.pdf>
3. Putnam, Robert D., "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organizations*. 42 (Summer 1988): 427-460.  
**Most of you have read this article elsewhere—if not, just skim, so you can be aware of the importance of domestic politics not just in negotiating, but in decision-making about war and peace matters)**

### **PREPARATION FOR CLASS EXERCISE, 6 NOVEMBER**

**Details will be discussed and team assignments will be disseminated**

***(If class is too large to give each group enough time, we may take an additional period)***

**Each team chooses a nation (other than the United States) in order to analyze the state of civil military relations and to look into whether there is real civilian control of the military You may**



**pick a specific period of time other than the present. Each team should address the following issues, *inter alia*:**

- 1. Is there effective civilian control of the military? What is your evidence?**
- 2. Describe the relationships, including all relevant branches of government.**
- 3. Is the society democratic, or if not, how would you characterize it?**
- 4. What characterizes the relationship between civil and military actors? Are the roles relatively delineated? In which situations have these roles played out?**
- 5. If civilian control is lacking, is there internal or external pressure to change the situation, with what results?**

---

**CLASS VII- OCTOBER 23, 2015**

**COUNTERTERRORISM: CIVIL-MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL INTERVENTION: IN PARTICULAR, STAND-OFF TARGETED KILLINGS.**

*In this class we will address some of the civil-military issue that have arisen in the greater uses of targeted killing in grey area warfare. We will examine some of the hard questions about the international legal underpinnings of a prevalent form of warfare and begin to understand the adaptations that have been required to engage in this form of warfare.*

**QUESTIONS:**

- A. Does it matter if drones are controlled by military or non-military (in US--CIA) forces? If so, why?
- B. Has targeted killing been adequately justified legally? What are the legal underpinnings? Are such attacks proper instruments of war? In a non-war situation how is the invasion of sovereignty without permission addressed when individuals are attacked outside a war zone?
- C. What authority should decide if the appropriate threshold for targeted killing has been reached?
- D. Has there been adequate explanation to satisfy publics in the United States and abroad?
- E. Does the state controlling the drones assume any obligations to those affected by attacks?

**READINGS**

1. Zenko, Micah, "Reforming US Drone Strike Policies," Council on Foreign Relations Report #65, January 13, 2001. <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736>
2. David J. Barron to Eric H. Holder, July 16, 2010, "Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi," U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Office of the Assistant Attorney General, 23–24, [https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field\\_document/2014-06-23\\_barron-memorandum.pdf](https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2014-06-23_barron-memorandum.pdf)
3. Chayes, Antonia, *Borderless Wars: Civil Military Disorder and Legal Uncertainty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Chapter VI-IX (pages 71-129).

4. Excerpt from Harold Koh, "The Obama Administration and International Law," delivered at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, March 25, 2010 pages 4-9.
5. Authorization of Use of Military Force Act (AUMF) (2001); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A.
6. Singer, Peter. "Do Drones Undermine Democracy?" New York Times, January 21, 2012
7. OPTIONAL: Blum, Gabriella and Phillip B. Heymann, "Law and Policy of Targeted Killing," Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 1, No. 45 (2010), pp. 145-170
8. OPTIONAL: Testimony of The Honorable John B. Bellinger III before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, February 27, 2013. "Drones and the War on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?"

---

**CLASS VIII: OCTOBER 30, 2015 : FEATURING GUEST HERBERT LIN**

**CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES IN NEW FORMS OF BATTLE: CYBER ATTACKS AND CYBERWAR**

*As we probe emerging forms of warfare, we will also address the new problems it poses for civil-military relations and the legal relationships that may be emerging or may be absent.*

**QUESTIONS**

- A. How has the ambiguity of cyber attacks affected civil military relations? Who are the crucial actors?
- B. What will serve as a definition of war to establish roles and legal relations?
- C. What are the legal underpinnings?

**READINGS**

1. *The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, April 2015.*  
[http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415\\_cyber-strategy/Final\\_2015\\_DoD\\_CYBER\\_STRATEGY\\_for\\_web.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf)
2. Lin, Herbert, "Learning from the Attack Against Sony," *Lawfare Blog*, January 23, 2015.  
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/learning-attack-against-sony>
3. Chayes, Antonia, *Borderless Wars: Civil Military Disorder and Legal Uncertainty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Chapters 10-13 (pgs 130-184).
4. O'Connell, Mary Ellen. "Cyber Security without Cyber War." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 17, no. 2 (2012): 187-209.
5. Koh, Harold "International Law in Cyberspace," remarks made at USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference, September 18, 2012, available at:  
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm>.

6. OPTIONAL: Hathaway et al., "The Law of Cyber Attack," *California Law Review*, Vol. 100: 817.
7. OPTIONAL: NATO Cyber Defence website, available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-856984FF-06F9E6E7/natolive/topics\\_78170.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-856984FF-06F9E6E7/natolive/topics_78170.htm).
8. OPTIONAL: Bethlehem, Daniel "Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors," *American Journal of International Law* 106, no. 4 (2012): 769-777.

---

**CLASS IX: November 06, 2015 CLASS EXERCISE**

*(If class is too large to give each group enough time, we may take an additional period)*

Each team chooses a nation (other than the United States) in order to analyze the state of civil military relations and to look into whether there is real civilian control of the military. You may pick a specific period of time other than the present. Each team should address the following issues, *inter alia*:

6. Is there effective civilian control of the military? What is your evidence?
7. Describe the relationships, including all relevant branches of government.
8. Is the society democratic, or if not, how would you characterize it?
9. What characterizes the relationship between civil and military actors? Are the roles relatively delineated? In which situations have these roles played out?
10. If civilian control is lacking, is there internal or external pressure to change the situation, with what results?

In preparation for the debrief, write an 1100-1500 essay addressing the syllabus' eleven Key Questions from page 2-3 relating to your nation from the exercise. No collaboration with other team members is allowed. It will help to inform the exercise debrief. It will be due no later than 5pm on November 11<sup>th</sup> via email to both Professor Chayes and Meg.

---

**CLASS X: NOVEMBER 13, 2015: DEBRIEF EXERCISE- First Hour**  
**VARIETIES OF PLANNING: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY APPROACHES**

**QUESTIONS**

- A. Under what circumstances, if any is it possible for civilians and military to plan jointly? Is it desirable? If so, of what value is it?
- B. Does Brooks offer a useful theoretical framework for thinking about one part of the planning process at the highest level of decision making-- strategic assessment?
- C. Are there *inherent* value or "preference" differences between civilian and military players that preclude effective cooperation at any level? Or is it more a matter of standard operating procedures?
- D. Is greater harmony and cooperation more likely at theatre level; tactical level? If so, why?
- E. Are there further problems reconciling views across participating nations and the UN—not to mention other organizations. Is it too hard a task to arrive at a coherent view of strategy and

operations that satisfies all players, especially when the various domestic politics of relevant nations are factored in?

## **READINGS**

(\*Readings, specific chapters and articles are tentative\*)

1. Brooks, Risa A. *Shaping Strategy* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Univ. Press (2008) (pp. 1-31).
2. Stavridis, James G, "Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and US Southern Command" (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2010), p. 54 to 71.
3. "PDD 56 - Managing Complex Contingency Operations", (May 1997), Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>
4. "NSPD 44 - Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization", Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>
5. "Conflict Analysis Framework: Field Guidelines & Procedures" CDA/Global Alliance for the Prevention of Armed Conflict/Norwegian Church Aid. May 2012
6. Pam, Jeremiah, "The Paradox of Complexity: Embracing its Contribution to Situational Understanding, Resisting its Temptation in Strategy and Operational plans" (NDC Forum Paper, Rome. July 2010)  
[http://www.usip.org/files/Grants-Fellows/Paradox%20of%20complexity%20in%20strategy%20-%20J%20Pam%20chapter%20in%20NATO%20Defense%20College%20forum%20paper%20on%20Complex%20Operations%20\(Jul%202010\).pdf](http://www.usip.org/files/Grants-Fellows/Paradox%20of%20complexity%20in%20strategy%20-%20J%20Pam%20chapter%20in%20NATO%20Defense%20College%20forum%20paper%20on%20Complex%20Operations%20(Jul%202010).pdf)

---

## **CLASS XI: NOVEMBER 20, 2015**

**A SECOND LOOK AT THE CIVILIAN CONTROL ISSUE: ALL NATIONS DO NOT RESEMBLE THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE. RELEVANCE TO POLICY AND THEORY: FOCUS ON EITHER PAKISTAN OR CHINA-GUEST LECTURER**

### **QUESTIONS:**

- A. What role does the past play in forging contemporary attitudes towards civil-military relations?
- B. Can one talk of civil-military relations if the line between the two is blurred?
- C. When do military coups happen and why?

### **READINGS: (only China on this syllabus—Pakistan to be added)**

- Sulmaan Khan, "The Coming Coup in China," *The American Interest*, February 2, 2015. Available online at <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/02/02/the-coming-coup-in-china/>

- Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua” *Armed Forces and Society* Vol. 31, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 227-244.
- Willy Lam, “The Rise of the Military-Space Faction,” *China Brief – The Jamestown Foundation*, Vol. 14, issue 18 (2014). Available online at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=42875&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=ab4e465ba64b133acae02b703de72551#.VFfqCYvF95I](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42875&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=ab4e465ba64b133acae02b703de72551#.VFfqCYvF95I)
- David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China’s Military: Military, Progress, and Prospects*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 2002. – Introduction and Chapter 2

**NO CLASS NOVEMBER 27, 2015 – THANKSGIVING BREAK**

---

**CLASS XII: December 4, 2015: ETHICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND WAR**

| Papers from American Academy Project [TBD](#)

---

**CLASS XIII: DECEMBER 11, 2015**

**APPROACHES TO EXPLAIN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, AND WRAP UP**

First hour: Professor Michael Glennon “National Security and Double Government”

Second hour: Wrap up and Reflections

**READINGS**

1. Glennon, Michael J. “National Security and Double Government” *Double Government*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). [\(book is short\)](#)